REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This review delves on the study of relevant theories that dwell on counterinsurgency (COIN) scholarships in the country, policy implementation models that were culled from various policy process frameworks of numerous scholars, and voluminous books and theses that deal with counterinsurgency policy implementation here and abroad.
Figure 13 – Framework for the Review of Literature
The rich Philippine experience in counterinsurgency has spurred earlier studies proposing local counterinsurgency models that would somehow approximate the right force combination of strategies to solve the insurgency concern.
These models were developed in periods of Philippine history that corresponded to transitions in government administrations. Crisol’s “Triad Model” was used during the Martial Law period under Marcos. Aguirre’s model was proposed during the re-democratization period of the Aquino administration. Thereafter, Yap’s model was advocated during the Ramos administration when he also served as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Finally, Sosmeña’s model was utilized during the Arroyo administration. All of these models have reflected diverse perspectives; however, each paradigm provided complementary improvements to the ones before it by providing for incremental policy adjustments showing the strategic addition of operational components in succeeding models.
Meanwhile, policy implementation models, based mainly on wider policy process frameworks, are likewise used as bases in comprehensively analyzing counterinsurgency policy implementation. Using these, various factors were identified to have contributed immensely to the success or failure of counterinsurgency policy implementation. The works of policy studies experts like Mendoza (1984), Anderson (1978 and 1984), Sobrepeña (1995) and Ruschefsky (1990) presented policy process frameworks that can best describe or approximate the country’s policy-making system. These authors have crafted counterinsurgency models that best suit the peculiarities of the Philippine insurgency scenario. Hence, their works serve as reliable sources in deriving various factors that are important for successful policy formulation and implementation.
On the other hand, books and theses also abound on the topic of counterinsurgency and recently, counterterrorism. The varying orientations and perspectives on insurgency and terrorism evidenced in these works reflect the diverse background and experiences of the authors. Nonetheless, valuable lessons can be extracted from all of these references. For one,
these works have collectively enumerated the most common operational variables in effective counterinsurgency campaigns across time and all over the world.
These various readings and works on counterinsurgency provided the foundation for the conceptualization of a counterinsurgency framework that will be propounded in this dissertation. This framework of analysis is anchored on all relevant theories and experiences that highlight the effect of the proximity of the external environment and all other security concerns in the administration of policies.
A. Relevant Theories/Models on Counterinsurgency
The Philippine insurgency is the longest-running uprising in the world today. It has already spanned for forty-three (43) years from the time the communist and Muslim insurgencies reappeared in the political scene in the late sixties and early seventies, respectively.
This predicament reflects poorly on the Philippine government’s internal security capabilities, especially since neighboring countries in the Southeast Asian region have successfully subdued their local insurgency problems early on. For this reason, the search for an adequate and lasting solution to Philippine insurgency continues to this day.
Figure 14 – Counterinsurgency Models
There are numerous personalities on counterinsurgency study but the most recognized authorities on the subject matter are: Brigadier General Jose M. Crisol, who served in the armed forces during the Marcos administration; Lieutenant General Alexander Aquirre, who actively pursued counterinsurgency during Aquino’s term; Lieutenant General Romulo F, Yap, who was the Commanding General of the Army during the Ramos presidency; and Dr. Gaudioso C. Sosmeña, who is a prominent scholar in the field of counterinsurgency studies. These luminaries have left indelible marks in the national security and defense arenas with their works on counterinsurgency. In fact, their writings are widely used in the development and formulation of Internal Security Operations (ISO) plans by the government.
1. Crisol’s “Triad” Model
General Crisol’s “Triad Model” was conceptualized during the Marcos administration at around the same time that the very first internal security operations plan, Oplan “Katatagan,” was comprehensively documented.
Figure 15 – Crisol’s “Triad” Model
In essence, Crisol proposed a “Balanced Mix” in fighting insurgency. The base of triangle represents intelligence, counter-intelligence, survey and research, which are essential requisites in describing and familiarizing the battlefield or area of operations. The two sides of the triangle represent counter-guerrilla combat operations, which refers to the actual physical confrontations between the government and the enemy force, and psychological welfare, which focuses on winning the “hearts and minds” of the local population. Crisol’s model addresses the flexibility and fluidity of the battle space by giving the field commander discretion in the combination of variables to be employed in combat operations as necessitated by the prevailing situation.
Nonetheless, the soundness of the approach forwarded by this model makes it highly reliable in small and massive military operations. At present, the Triad is still widely used in the development of Special Operations Teams (SOT) Doctrine.
2. Aguirre’s “Public Safety Approach”
Lieutenant General Alexander Aguirre’s model was conceptualized at the light of the People Power euphoria during the EDSA 1 Revolution in 1986. Sensing the futility of the implementation of Oplan “Katatagan” with the exigencies of the times, Oplan “Makabayan” was crafted to shift the strong state-orientation of security operations towards a more people-oriented direction.
Aguirre’s “Circle Model” improved on Crisol’s triad components of combat, psychological operations and intelligence by adding development programs and public safety functions in counterinsurgency operations to effectively put insurgents within the legal and constitutional framework of the new administration. As in the triad concept, the proportion of utilization of components depends on the field commander’s assessment of the combat situation after considering all factors in the operational environment.
Figure 16 – Aguirre’s “Public Safety Approach” Model
Aguirre also took into serious consideration the limited resources available for disposal which largely affect policy implementation. He noted that if one area of the campaign will be enlarged, the size(s) of one or all of the other programs would necessarily have to be adjusted for the meager operational budget to suffice.
Aguirre (1987) stated that in Phases I and II of the counterinsurgency campaign, public safety operations and developmental program implementation are the primary focus, with intelligence operations as a secondary concern. On the other hand, military combat operations will be resorted to only on known insurgent concentration areas. Meanwhile, in Phases III and IV of the campaign, the resources for military combat operations should be enlarged with it as the focal point, resulting to the consequent decrease in the shares of the other programs.
The salient feature of Aguirre’s model is the way that the diagram can be made to portray graduated and flexible responses by changing the sizes of the “slices of the pie” or by varying the corresponding shares of different programs in the resources as required by the times.
Moreover, Aguirre explained that the interface of various operations/programs in this model converge at the center of the circle, which can clearly depict the differences in the amount of effort to be exerted or the degree of support to be extended. These different components mutually reinforce each other for a more systematic response to the threat of insurgency.
Lastly, the primacy of the rule of law and the dire need for development were incorporated in the Aguirre’s “Circle Model.”
3. Relative Magnitude of Counterinsurgency Efforts/Activities
This model details the different phases of insurgency progression from Subversion to Guerrilla Warfare, Insurrection and finally, Civil War. Moreover, it proposed the turnover of counterinsurgency mission from combat/military forces to law enforcement officers – the shift of control from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to the Philippine National Police (PNP), then back again to the AFP. On the other hand, the transition curve corresponds with the different phases of insurgency reflecting corresponding adjustments on attendant resources as required by the existing internal security situation subject to the prevailing priorities of the operations.
Figure 17 - Relative Magnitude of Counterinsurgency Efforts/Activities
4. The “Quarter Storms”
This complementary model to Aguirre’s “public safety approach” was developed based on the ASEAN history of insurgency and on the CPP/NPA strategy. Aguirre had considered the historical experiences of four (4) Southeast Asian countries in crafting this model - the Philippines, Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos. He recorded four (4) phases in the broad communist strategic thrust, namely: Phase I- Subversion; Phase II - Small-band Operations or Guerrilla Warfare; Phase III - Insurrection; and Phase IV- Civil War. These phases are often referred to as “quarter storms” in other subversive literature.
Phase I (Subversion) is characterized by infiltration, agitation and propaganda work against the government. The main objective of this phase is the alienation of the people from the government. Here, organizational work like recruitment is undertaken to sustain and strengthen their movement. Insurgents would subsequently target the political, psycho-social and economic institutions and the military establishment.
Phase II (Guerrilla Warfare) is accomplished using hit-and-run tactics, ambuscades, raids, sabotage and assassinations. It focuses on the establishment of a resistance which aims to challenge the regime and further alienate the people.
Phase III (Insurrection) is carried out by the conduct of armed conflict against the government in an integrated territory. The objectives are generating popular uprising against the regime, intensifying the armed insurrection, and enhancing the rapid deterioration and destruction of the military and political organizations of the government. At this stage, the insurgent forces have already generated the capability to confront large military forces and sustain armed conflicts against government forces.
Finally, Phase IV (Civil War) is the final phase where a war between contesting governments and armed forces will occur. At this stage, the insurgents have already formed a well-developed political organization and a stronger military capability to be able to sustain a military confrontation which aims to bring out the collapse of the government and the destruction of its armed forces.
Aguirre used these different phases to prove his point that the two models actually overlap or coincide with each other. He proposed that his models could be used in tandem to respond to the exigencies of each phase as they transpire. Aguirre further advocated for the adoption of his strategy by the government.
5. Yap’s “Macro 4 - Triad” Model
Lieutenant General Yap proposed another improved version of the Crisol Triad called the “Macro Four-Triad Model.” The model combined four triangles to form the macro 4–triad, which incorporates the “Triad Model” as only one part of the framework.
Figure 18 – Yap’s “Macro 4 – Triad” Model
Yap (2007) explained that Crisol’s triad of military operations is only the “right-hand” part of the new 4-triad model that represents the military aspect of the war against insurgency. At the left-hand side of the paradigm is another dimension of the “strategy of holistic approach” which is primarily handled by civilian government agencies in all levels and by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well. Yap continued that the purpose of this arrangement is to preserve the gains of the military operations by advocating the “civilian” aspects or the “Consolidate and Develop” phases of the established Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop (CHCD) paradigm. Yap further argued that the left and right hand wings of the model emphasize the nature of the roles of the military and other state instrumentalities, and also of different civilian actors in counterinsurgency operations.
The top and bottom triads outline the mode and purpose of counterinsurgency operations in pursuance with each mission level – strategic, operational, or tactical. The upper part of the model represents the political, psychological, and ideological separation of the insurgent movements from the “minds and hearts” of the people while the lower triad reflects the need for physical isolation and destruction of the enemy forces.
Yap’s model emphasized the outmost significance and the pivotal role of intelligence gathering, handling and utilization together with strategic communication in both civilian and military operations. This focus aims to generate information that would provide direction in policy adjustments that would be adopted by the government in responding to enemy movements.
Hence, aside from being a template for initial counterinsurgency planning and operations, the macro 4-triad model could also be used as a general parameter in assessing and reviewing the direction and coherence of counterinsurgency operations that are already being implemented. It was presented as an effective tool in analyzing the performance of all concerned agencies with regard to the convergence of counterinsurgency efforts.
The improvements in Yap’s model, in contrast with the earlier models, prove its relevance to counterinsurgency policy-making and implementation. It departs from a purely militaristic focus and incorporates the participation of civilian instrumentalities. However, the main actor remains to be the military force and its primary role is reinforced through the intelligence aspect of the model. This feature is at the center point of the four-triad model.
6. Sosmena’s Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) Strategy
Dr. Gaudioso C. Sosmeña followed the approach of the US War College in proposing a strategy that requires the participation of local government units and other civilian agencies in some areas of the counterinsurgency campaign like in human or civil assistance and population and resource control.
The Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) Strategy consists of a full range of measures taken by a country under threat, to provide for its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency. This model includes the following components: a) Intelligence operations; b) Logistical Support operations; c) Population and Resources control; d) Civilian-military operations which incorporate civil action and psychological operations; e) Human or civil assistance; and f) Tactical operations. On a different note, these new components are also visible in the military operations of the US forces as manifested in the military aid it provides to the Philippine government in pursuance with the US-led global War against Terror.
Figure 19 - Sosmena’s “Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) Strategy”
According to Sosmeña (2006), civil-military operations including human or civil assistance are not reflected in the government’s current counterinsurgency operations while intelligence operations, and population and resources control have not been fully operationalized. He noted that the counterinsurgency programs in the past have not satisfactorily achieved their objectives; reflecting the negative implications of policy dissonances that characterized the overall counterinsurgency strategy of the Philippine government.
While Sosmeña’s model is very comprehensive and encompassing, some of its components have never been employed in the Philippine insurgency setting. This fact creates an air of apprehension that the application of these components would entail risks and possible downfalls in counterinsurgency policy formulation and implementation.
The IDAD Strategy of Sosmeña revealed the utility of the policy process framework in counterinsurgency analysis. According to the author, a serious policy study can lead to more productive outcomes for counterinsurgency policy implementation. Sosmeña suggests that a review of our country’s counterinsurgency policies through policy analysis will prevent a fatal error in implementation.
B. Policy Implementation Models
This dissertation takes off from the argument of Grindle and Thomas (1990) that the “analysis of implementation feasibility should thus become an essential part of policy analysis.” The study’s main focus is the assessment of the implementation of various counterinsurgency policies in view of the discouraging reality that the Philippine government has not yet succeeded in finally eradicating the problem of armed insurgency in the country.
For this research, various policy process models were reviewed and considered in the search for a feasible policy implementation framework that will be of great utility in the development of a more responsive and effective counterinsurgency model.
Anderson’s (1978) first policy process model discussed the phases of counterinsurgency policy formulation: agenda formulation, policy stage adoption, implementation, and evaluation. Thereafter, he refined this model such that in 1984, his new policy process framework started with problem identification and agenda formation, then formulation and lastly, evaluation. In this newer model, more details were added to the paradigm as to the processes used and participants involved.
Meanwhile, Sobrepeña’s (1995) model closely follows Anderson’s latest model but takes the higher plane by involving state actors rather than just individual players in the whole process.
Mendoza’s (1994) policy process model takes a more comprehensive route by detailing the processes of agenda building, alternative development, policy adoption and advocacy, policy implementation, performance evaluation, problem re-definition and change advocacy. The added feature of this paradigm is the inclusion of the advocacy agenda in counterinsurgency initiatives.
On the other hand, Paul and Vining’s (1981) model details the success and failure variables in policy implementation; this runs similar to Gow and Morss’ (1988) paradigm which details the nine (9) critical variables in policy implementation.
These earlier models also focused on the Implementation Phase of the counterinsurgency campaign. Moreover, the combination of operational variables adopted by each model is different from the rest.
1. Anderson’s Policy Process Model (1978)
Anderson specifically highlighted the government’s primary role in counterinsurgency policy implementation through the use of its administrative machinery.
Figure 20 - Anderson’s Policy Process Model (1978)
In Anderson’s model, the Armed Forces of the Philippines is the main agency appointed in the implementation of counterinsurgency policies. In studying its role in combating insurgency and its effectivity in performing its functions, focus was made on the organization’s structure, objectives, procedures, and reforms.
2. Anderson’s Policy Process Framework (1984)
The latest innovation of Anderson’s model moves the focus away from the government and shifts it to individual stakeholders who are largely involved in the implementation of counterinsurgency policies. It also inquires into the actions adopted to carry out the policies effectively and the impact they have made on the national security situation of the country.
Figure 21- Anderson’s Policy Process Framework (1984)
In comparison, this later version truly delves on the more practical aspect of policy implementation as individual actors and specific actions were identified and gauged with regard to the effect they have in eliminating the insurgency problem.
3. Sobrepeña’s Public Policy-Making Process (1995)
This model of Sobrepeña (1995) looks at implementation from another perspective and includes the mobilization of resources and application of policies in achieving the objectives of counterinsurgency.
Figure 22 - Sobrepeña’s Public Policy-making Process (1995)
This model, in a way, focuses on the importance of resources in providing adequate and dynamic funding to different activities outlined in the counterinsurgency operations plan. The vital infusion of resources as shown in the paradigm somehow mirror the actual proceedings in the battleground.
4. Mendoza’s Policy Process Model (1994)
Mendoza’s model gave a constructive and indispensable framework to counterinsurgency policy analysis as success factors and pitfalls in policy implementation were identified and discussed.
Figure 23 - Mendoza’s Policy Process Model (1994)
This framework of analysis is very much attuned to the AFP’s quest for an effective counterinsurgency framework, as success has been constantly elusive for the government’s counterinsurgency campaign. The correct and adequate identification of operational variables would be a significant improvement on campaign policy formulation.
5. Paul and Vining’s Success and Failure Factors (1981)
The model enumerates five (5) important variables that contribute to successful policy implementation. These are: leadership and strategic management, structure, resources, support and technology. The significance of these factors is supported by Iglesias’ (1986) analysis of the role of leadership in policy implementation; these variables were also identified by Gow and Morss (1988), and by Paul and Vining in their respective models.
C. Counterinsurgency’s Success and Failure Factors
Voluminous references abound on the subject of counterinsurgency. In ascertaining the role of leadership in counterinsurgency, valuable insights can be taken from the Philippine experience.
1. Historical Perspective
The country’s background in counterinsurgency operations can be traced back to as early as the Spanish colonization of the Philippines. According to Milan and Catalan (1972), there had been two major transitions in Philippine counterinsurgency. The first one refers to the struggle for independence of our Filipino ancestors against Philippine colonizers from the Spanish times until the period of the Japanese invasion. In these uprisings, Filipino freedom fighters were considered as insurgents. The second phase dawned after the end of World War II when Filipinos started fighting the government for justice and equality. This latter stage, unfortunately, has extended up to the present times.
a. Spanish Colonization
Milan and Catalan related that during the Spanish colonization, the government authorities, in its attempt to solve the worsening insurgency situation in the Philippines, implemented a “policy of attraction” granting amnesty to insurgent surrenderees. The Spanish government also offered money to the surrenderees to restore peace and order in the country. In addition, decrees were issued granting compensation to the owners of all private properties damaged or destroyed due to the government’s military operations, and cautioning the Spanish authorities not to indiscriminately or unjustly arrest or imprison those who were not implicated in the revolution. However, these measures were not enough to quell the insurgency. For fear that the revolutionists will continue to spread havoc among the people, the “Iron Hand Policy” was implemented. Consequently, the conduct of sustained military operations against the Filipino fighters weakened the insurgent forces.
b. Bonifacio’s Katipuneros
The most formidable Filipino insurgent group during the Spanish period was the “Katipunan” headed by Andres Bonifacio. Bonifacio adopted a “policy of attraction” towards the wealthy and highly-educated Filipinos of his time to change the attitude of those who have no confidence in his leadership and no faith in a revolution under the banner of the proletariat, and to enlist the support of all Filipinos who could contribute large sums of money or provide technical knowledge and skills to ensure the success of the revolution. He emphasized the significance of unity and harmony by establishing a Revolutionary Government to mend the gap between the two factions in the organization – the Magdalo and the Magdiwang.
c. Aguinaldo’s Illustrados
After successfully subduing the Bonifacio–led insurgent forces, Aguinaldo implemented the“All-Out Force” and “All-Out Operation” campaigns against the Spanish colonizers to gain freedom and independence for his countrymen. He developed a policy of maintaining good relations with the American government in the belief that he could gain its support in the struggle for independence. On the other hand, he issued a policy for the protection of the lives and properties of foreigners who will lay down their arms.
d. American Occupation
After the Spanish regime, the American government implemented counterinsurgency policies with the main objective of keeping the Philippine Islands away from the hands of Filipino freedom fighters. The continuous and relentless offensives of American forces against the Filipino fighters drove the latter to employ delaying actions as they made their retreat to the countryside. The successive victories of the Americans prompted the Filipino insurgents to initiate an “All-Out Guerrilla Warfare” using hit-and-run tactics. These disintegrated guerrilla actions sustained the struggle against a superior force.
e. Commonwealth Time
The birth of the Philippine Republic ushered in the Commonwealth period during which time the National Defense Act was enacted for the protection of the Philippine Islands from external aggression. Since the primary objective of the law was for territorial defense, there was a necessity for an adequate defense establishment with increased manpower and improved logistics. Additionally, sufficient military training was required to assure the survival of the new Republic. Unfortunately, the national government was incapable and unable to comply with the said defense requirements which made the Philippine territory completely vulnerable to foreign aggression.
f. Japanese Intrusion
The outbreak of World War II necessitated the induction of Filipino soldiers to the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) with the primary goal of defending the Pacific region. The American government adopted a “Europe First” policy in its military strategy during the war. When the Japanese invaded the Philippines, Filipino soldiers who were separated from the USAFFE organization continued with their resistance. Unity and cooperation between the American and Filipino forces were manifested through guerrilla actions.
g. Osmeña’s “Rehabilitation”
After the devastation of World War II, President Osmeña implemented a national policy recognizing and rewarding those who fought against the Japanese forces. All those who have served for recognized guerrilla units were considered in active duty with the Philippine Army. This recognition was followed by the reactivation of Philippine Army (PA) units and the designation of respective commanders to promote peace and order in the liberated areas of the country. In addition, the soldiers were subjected to intensive trainings to equip them with adequate knowledge in modern warfare. Logistical requirements were also improved and the development of the Army’s reserve component was intensified to have an efficient and effective defense force. On a different note, there was exposure of anomalies and irregularities through which the government’s internal enemies were identified and correspondingly dealt with.
h. Roxas’ “Mailed-Fist” Policy
Later on, Roxas launched a pacification drive persuading the lawless elements to return to the folds of the law. He also offered socio-political and economic reforms to improve their standard of living. With the display of belligerency of the leaders of the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (HUKBALAHAP), a “Mailed-Fist” policy was implemented directing the Military Police Command (MPC) to conduct relentless military operations against the insurgents utilizing the whole of the military machinery. But the government’s actions were unsuccessful. Guerrilla operations continued even after the establishment of peaceful conditions in the country.
i. Quirino’s Policy of “Attraction”
Quirino’s proclamation of the General Assembly led to the surrender of some leaders and members of the two rebel associations known as the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon and Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid (PKM). However, Quirino’s failure to implement social and agrarian reforms, and execute the release of some 500 Huk prisoners, drove the surrenderees back to the battlefield. This led to a protracted counterinsurgency campaign against the dissidents. Meanwhile, the AFP adopted intensified training programs for career upgrading and skills development of the soldiers which significantly contributed to the relative success in the performance of its military mission.
j. Magsaysay’s “All-Out Force and All-Out Friendship”
After the “Mailed-Fist” policy and the proclamation of the General Assembly, Magsaysay’s implementation of a two-pronged policy - the “All-Out Force and All-Out Friendship” - resulted to the mass surrender of dissidents including key leaders. Psychological operations were conducted through the Civil Affairs Office (CAO) which informed the populace of the pernicious effects of the communist menace and the lost cause that the insurgents have been fighting for. With the implementation of socio-economic programs, medical and dental services were provided to the people to attract insurgents to put down their arms. In the meantime, intensified intelligence operations were conducted by the respective defense systems of each major service. Additionally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Board (MDB) was established to effectively implement certain provisions of existing defense agreements between the two countries.
k. Garcia’s Policy of “Persuasion”
In view of the policy of “Fiscal Restraint,” the AFP made the necessary changes in the organization and conducted numerous trainings and equipping of its regular and reserve forces. To make the policy more effective, the strength of the Army was reduced with the Constabulary designating for each constabulary zone a commander who was responsible for peace and order within its jurisdiction. In pursuance of the government’s socio-economic programs, the AFP directed the Engineers Construction Group (ECG) to undertake the construction of infrastructure projects. Rescue and relief assistance were extended to disaster-stricken areas, and the maintenance of agro-military projects in Mindanao were likewise undertaken. Meanwhile, the RP-US MDB continued to perform its prescribed duties and responsibilities in pursuing domestic actions to internal problems.
l. Macapagal’s “Filipino First” Policy
To contain the insurgents, the AFP modernized its organizational structure, strengthened the training of reservists, maintained the combat readiness of its regular units, intensified the execution of anti-dissident campaigns, and conscientiously carried out its commitment to the Mutual Defense Agreement. In addition, it also implemented socio-political and economic reforms to counter the resurgence of insurgency. These perpetuated the previous administration’s socio-economic programs as well as its military actions.
The Philippine counterinsurgency experience in the course of time from the birth of the nation at the turn of the 20th century up to the new millennium reflects the hard truth that counterinsurgency has always been a pre-occupation of the Philippine government in past and present administrations.
The military strategies and policies documented by Milan and Catalan (1972) reveal the orchestration and control of operations by the established government against insurgent forces. The operational responsibilities were seen to have been well distributed and relegated within the government structure.
The review also documented the myriad of methods and approaches applied to lure insurgents back into the folds of law or, if this was not achieved, engage them in an all-out war. As revealed in the above discussion, the guerrilla form of warfare was continually used from the Spanish times to post World–War II Philippines.
D. Relevant Studies
Various theses from international and local authors have offered rich insights into how counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations were applied in their own domains. The voluminous references mostly referred to the US and the British government’s experiences in small or guerrilla wars.
Other helpful contributions also delved on the counterinsurgency experiences of regional counterparts from Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. The Philippine experience topped all these seminal works with real-time observations from various scholars and field practitioners.
1. On Leadership and Strategic Management
Aside from the our nation’s rich experience in insurgency and counterinsurgency, foreign and selected local readings also offer learning that helps define leadership and strategic management in the counterinsurgency setting. These works illustrate how top level leadership and management control the tempo of operations and orchestrate holistic responses. The participation of other players with the accomplishment of delegated missions or tasks also reveal the establishment of a hierarchy in the coalition forces as brought about by joint campaign planning. In addition, the application of varied approaches and development methodologies is evident in these works. However, focus is centered on the guerrilla form of warfare in counterinsurgency operations.
It is highly notable that the United States counterinsurgency experience occupies a relevant portion of this review since it has comprehensively documented its various engagements against different insurgencies in the South East, Middle East regions and in Latin American countries.
Pojar (2005) explored the ongoing Malay-Muslim separatist insurgency in southern Thailand and offered an example on the level of control and orchestration that was adopted by the head of government. The author argued that historically-rooted structural factors which include relative economic deprivation, limited political integration and the struggle for the maintenance of ethnic-religious identity are the main causes of this insurgency. He identified two catalysts for the renewal of this insurgency - one internal and one external. The internal catalyst was a suppressive government regime under the leadership of Prime Minister Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai Party. The external catalyst was the growing, increasingly radicalized Islamist movement which was largely defined by terrorist violence like the one expressed in the 9/11 US World Trade Center attacks. The combination of these factors had rekindled secessionist violence of a previously unseen level in the Thai provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala. Given the deeply ingrained structural causes of this insurgency, as well as a government administration whose policies and conflict mismanagement continually fuel the violence, the prospect for conflict resolution is not promising. Pojar argued that it will be in the best interests of the United States for the conflict to be resolved at once. Should the insurgency continue growing, the situation may reach a point of drastic consequences for Thailand as well as the United States. The Thailand experience shows that external intervention is important in dealing with internal security problems.
In the local scene, Luga (2002) discussed the historical evolution of the Muslim uprising in Mindanao and how the present Muslim secessionist groups - the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) - evolved from this rebellion which started way back in the sixteenth century.
He also discussed the peace initiatives that were orchestrated by the Philippine government in trying to put an end to this problem. Luga indicated that the initial causes of Muslim secessionism are deeply rooted in the country’s colonial past while the immediate and current causes can be traced to the government’s neglect and abuses, the corrupt practices of local/traditional Muslim leaders, agrarian discontent and land disputes, and the resurgence of the Islamic religion worldwide. According to the author, the Philippine government must pursue peace initiatives in addressing the Mindanao predicament. These peace negotiations should be conducted along the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement and within Philippine constitutional bounds. This approach denotes a top level strategic management solution for peace.
Likewise, government initiatives for peaceful conflict resolution were examined by Domingo (1995) when he reviewed the peace negotiations between the Philippine government and the MNLF that resulted in the signing of the Tripoli Agreement in 1976. However, he observed that the divergent interpretations by the parties of the autonomy issue caused a breakdown in the negotiations which consequently led to the resumption of hostilities. Domingo further related that the negotiations conducted during Aquino's presidency did not resolve the problem. The secessionist issue continued to be a daunting problem for the government in the 1990’s during Ramos’ term. However, his administration renewed peace negotiations with the MNLF with the National Unification Commission (NUC) spearheading the government reconciliation effort. This time, an administrative machinery was delegated to attend to the negotiations.
A delineation of counterinsurgency tasks was exemplified in the comparative campaign planning process documented by Miller (2003). He discussed that the United States has conducted or supported more than a dozen counterinsurgency operations in the 20th century. He detailed that the emerging global strategic environment indicates that the US will still be involved in counterinsurgency operations in the future, however, there appears to exist operational shortfalls in the formulation and execution of its counterinsurgency campaigns. He revealed that a coherent planning model based on operational art is necessary in order to manage the increasing complexity of the counterinsurgency environment. A joint campaign planning model which includes the participation of other forces may provide the appropriate means to address these shortfalls.
According to Miller, the counterinsurgency environment can be defined through the examination of the current operating environment and the nature of 21st century insurgency. He added that counterinsurgency theories and current US doctrines must be evaluated in order to demonstrate the existence of operational shortfalls. Operational art and campaign planning must be advocated and discussed to provide the basis for evaluating the planning deficits. His proposal is supported by two historical case studies, that of the Philippines (1948-1954) and El Salvador (1980-1992). These studies illustrate the implementation of existing counterinsurgency doctrines and campaign planning methodologies and their relative success or failure in combating insurgency. The author also highlighted the significant body of knowledge on campaign design that can be applied to counterinsurgency and emphasized that the joint campaign planning model provides an appropriate outline for the delineation of tasks and responsibilities among different stakeholders. Above all, he underscored that there is an immediate need to reexamine the US counterinsurgency doctrine in terms of operational art to address the identified shortfalls. Miller also recognized that the existing challenge is how to define an integrated operational concept which combines persuasive and coercive elements into a campaign design through the application of all the elements of national power.
Metz and Millen (2004) also noted the role of the United States in supporting counterinsurgencies worldwide. They initially discussed that insurgency has existed throughout history but ebbed and flowed in strategic significance. They observed that the world has entered another period when insurgency is common and strategically significant and is likely to continue for at least a decade or longer. As the United States confronts this threat, the authors argued that extrapolating old ideas, strategies, doctrine and operational concepts is a recipe for failure; hence a re-conceptualization is needed. The present strategic salience of insurgency to the United States is higher than it has ever been since the height of the Cold War. The insurgency problem remains a major concern for the United States because of its two dominant characteristics - protractedness and ambiguity – which mitigate the effectiveness of the American military. In addition, the authors opined that the broader US national security organization is not optimized for counterinsurgency support. They reminded that a nation is only as good at counterinsurgency support as its weakest link, not its strongest.
Further, the authors observed that the existing American military strategy and doctrines have their focus primarily on national insurgencies. As a result of this, military actions center on selective engagement; formation of a support coalition, if possible; sustainment of the American presence to a minimum level to attain strategic objectives; augmentation of the regime's military, intelligence, political, informational and economic capabilities; and encouragement and development of reforms designed to address the shortcomings of the counterinsurgency campaigns and the root causes of the insurgency problem. The authors recommended that the key to success is not for the US military to become better at counterinsurgency, but for the military establishment and other government instrumentalities to be skilled at helping the local security and intelligence forces to become effective at it.
Mills (1997) reexamined the principles of war and offered another approach to counterinsurgency. He posited that the Philippine insurrection was America’s first venture into the realm of what we now know as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). He argued that the Philippine scenario provides a good case from which military and civilian leaders of today can learn significant lessons in planning and executing operations in MOOTW by examining key issues and events using the principles of MOOTW, with particular attention to the principles of objective, legitimacy, security and restraint. The preparation and conduct of the Philippine campaign demonstrated the difficulties involved in the development of national policies and the complications which arise in the execution of those policies. He further illustrated the interconnectivity of the six principles of MOOTW and the need to consider them not individually but as a whole. More significantly, he pointed out that the principle of objective is the cornerstone from which all the other principles were derived from. Without sound and clear objectives, it would be impossible to maintain unity of efforts, cultivate the perseverance necessary to win and keep the legitimacy required for continued support. Further, Mills said that the ability of the United States’ leadership to properly assess the critical issues within each of the principles of MOOTW will determine not only the magnitude but the intensity with which it will participate in these types of operations.He then recommended that the US leadership take every opportunity to study and learn from its past endeavors to ensure that past mistakes are not repeated.
Going over to the British counterinsurgency experience, Cassidy (2005) suggested that strategic approaches and methodologies must likewise be set. He observed that the key to the British Army’s success in counterinsurgency operations was its integrated civil-military approach - civilian officials remained in control of emergencies and were responsible for the broader political strategy and propaganda. Moreover, the British Army operated under civilian control and accepted the requirement of employing minimum force. Even though it preferred large-scale operations in the early phases of its campaigns, the British Army tended to be flexible - adapting to meet local circumstances and switching to small-unit operations with decentralized control when it became evident that large-scale sweeps will not succeed.
A similar pattern emerged in the subsequent British Army experience in Northern Ireland. It was observed in one study that in counterinsurgency operations, the civil authorities remained in control; minimum force was generally used; new tactics were constantly developed and tactical control devolved; close relations were established with the police; and the Army adopted a broader-based political strategy. These actions manifest the British Army’s adoption of guerrilla warfare in its operations.
Shifting back to Philippine counterinsurgency, Achurra (1975) observed that the “total approach” has been adopted by the government in counterinsurgency even as early as the Martial Law period. He stated that insurgency and subversion in the Philippines led to the development of an effective self-reliant strategy based on the “total approach.” The author provided important insights regarding insurgent and leftist activities in the Philippines. He promoted various actions and programs to be adopted by the government as counterinsurgent measures.
Similarly, Hernando (1975) also provided a stepping-stone in the formulation of a body of doctrines to be employed in counterinsurgency warfare. His discussion covered the origin, organization and techniques of communist insurgency warfare. He also highlighted the government’s holistic response to the existing rebellion.
On the other hand, Sile (1975) compared the principal counterinsurgency doctrines employed by insurgents in the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam. His study traced the birth, development and structure of different insurgencies and examined the doctrines utilized by the communist subversives from 1945 to 1974. His body of work offered a comprehensive doctrinal analysis with a view to confronting the totality of the armed insurgent threat.
As discussed, the abovementioned studies recommended the use of the “total approach” in counterinsurgency, which first found its relevance in the days of the Marcos administration.
As regards the adoption of the form of warfare, Tiernan (2002) discussed the similarities and differences in two ongoing insurgencies in the Philippines – communism and Muslim secessionism. He related that each one has its own root causes and ideologies. The first one is a holdover of the twentieth century communist revolutions while the second is an ethno-religiously based revolution that may be more common in the early twenty-first century. On the surface, these conflicts seem different from each other. However, he observed that with regard to the factors of operational warfare, it appears that both conflicts are more alike than different. The use of the Maoist model, the existence of internal divisions in the movement, the use of terror tactics and clamor for economic reforms are common to both insurgencies. He further commented that although every insurgency is unique and no definitive template exists that applies to all, military planners may still be able to take the lessons learned from past insurgencies and apply them to counterinsurgency efforts at present times and in the future. Tiernan recommended that as guerrilla warfare is the form of war adopted by the two insurgent groups, the same should be used by the government to effectively address the threats.
On the western front, Cassidy (2005) related that the British Army has excelled in small-unit, anti-guerrilla warfare as they did in other aspects of counterinsurgency. History had given them an army that is relatively small and decentralized and, therefore, ideally suited to such warfare. Since Britain is an island nation, the Navy and not the Army has been its first line of defense. Distrusted and underfunded, the junior service was thus relatively unaffected by the revolution in size and organization experienced by continental armies during the 19th century.
Historically, the British Army culture has influenced the British approach to counterinsurgency. The British Army’s experience in small wars and counterinsurgency campaigns during the 19th and 20th centuries remain topical and salient. The US military and its coalition partners, including Britain, are pursuing counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa and elsewhere following the British counterinsurgency approach.
If US military culture has traditionally exhibited a preference for a big, conventional-war paradigm and if this preference has impeded its capacity to adapt to small wars and counterinsurgency operations, then there might be something to gain or learn from examining the cultural characteristics of another army with a greater propensity for counterinsurgency. An analysis of British military cultural predilections in the context of counterinsurgency is therefore germane because the US military is transforming while in contact, and a big part of transformation is about military cultural change. Military culture comprises the beliefs and attitudes within a military organization that shape its collective preferences toward the use of force. These attitudes can impede or foster innovation and adaptation. Military culture sometimes exhibits preferences for either small wars or big wars. In recent years, both the British and US Armies have adopted the small war technique in their counterinsurgency campaign.
2. On Structure
There are also numerous studies on the importance of establishing a sound counterinsurgency structure for a successful counterinsurgency campaign. Local and foreign authors are one in their view that an effective political-administrative machinery must be established by governments who suffer from insurgency. Military personnel are also an integral factor in the counterinsurgent structure such that their essential training and exposure to insurgency situations can influence their over-all performance of duty. The participation of and coordination among other security stakeholders are also seen as important variables to carry out different development tasks. Here, paramilitary forces and local government units and civilian volunteers are factored in. The support of other law enforcement agencies and even of foreign counterparts is likewise considered in many cases.
In the local scene, Manalo (2004) analyzed the Philippine responses to terrorism and in the process determined how the government can develop a responsive organizational structure that would address the security problems faced by governmental agencies, specifically those posed by the Abu Sayyaf Group. In addition, he presented a case study of the ASG by analyzing its organizational and operational tools in maintaining its terrorist capability, and then examined the government bureaucracy and its capability to respond to the threats posed by the ASG and terrorism in the whole. The author observed that despite the initial success of the joint Philippine and US Balikatan Exercises against the ASG in 2002, the latter has continued to carry out attacks on lightly guarded or "soft" targets, the same way international terrorist groups have been known to do. However, it cannot be discounted that this mutual relationship between the two governments, to some degree, strengthens the administrative structure of the Philippine government in confronting the terrorist menace. Manalo stated that the war on terrorism has changed the lives of Filipinos and strained the capabilities of the national government. Over the years, the Philippines has continually fought terrorism in many ways. It has retaliated militarily, prosecuted terrorists, preempted terrorist attacks, implemented defensive measures and addressed directly some of the root causes of terrorism. To some degree, both parties suffer from limited effectiveness and applicability of strategies. He concluded by emphasizing the primary role of the government in leading the war on terror and other insurgent threats.
These observations of Manalo was supported by Highland (2003) who opined that the US, occupying the sole position of leadership in the world in terms of economic and military strength, has increasingly found itself in situations where the demands of global and regional stability have been placed squarely on the shoulders of its national leaders. Faced with the prospect of ethnic, religious, cultural and nationalistic clashes that are no longer held in check by the two superpowers – the US and the former Soviet Union - and given the increased threats posed by transnational actors, every agency involved in the application of national power has struggled to develop policies which will guide them through the minefield posed by the fractious nature of the "New World Disorder." This present role of the US government as the sole “superpower” has underscored its indispensability in the global fight against terrorism. The author argued that the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001 served as a crucial point which provided clarity and direction to the US national security strategy. Following these attacks, the US has delineated the steps it intended to take in response to transnational or global terrorism. These are: (1) to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations or any or state-sponsored terrorist groups which attempt to gain or use weapons of mass destruction; (2) if necessary, to exercise the right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorist groups; and (3) to support moderate and modern governments all around the world, especially in Muslim territories, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation. On the other hand, Highland’s thesis had likewise highlighted the responses made by political and administrative institutions in addressing the insurgency problem.
On a different note, Schmid (2003) pointed out that the United States’ Pacific Command (USPACOM) can support a successful counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines by following a humble, discerning and patient plan that highlights the three most pressing lessons learned from the US counterinsurgency effort in El Salvador. These lessons were: (1) a smaller military presence is better; (2) a reform-oriented host government is necessary; and (3) goodwill, rather than the military strategy, is the most effective tool in fighting insurgency. He suggested that the government must constantly institute reforms to be more effective in attaining its objectives. The author further argued that this approach is significant because it (1) appreciates the subtle and not-so-subtle differences between principles of MOOTW and the principles of war, (2) highlights the importance of shaping the environment, and (3) recognizes that treating the insurgency situation in the Philippines as a Jihad-inspired revolution is simplistic and will not address the root causes of the problem. Schmid emphasized that, more than anything, the host government’s institutions must eradicate the causes that led to dissent through the institution of responsive social, political and economic reforms.
Aside from dissecting the government’s administrative structure, Guzman (1975) also provided a comparative examination of the organizational structures, strengths, logistics and activities of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) and the New Peoples’ Army (NPA). This analysis pointed to the formation of a military structure which is effective against the enemy form and movements.
Meanwhile, Graff (2004) moved for a unified counterinsurgency structure which fortifies the vital linkage with other economic, social and political stakeholders. He examined the conduct of the US Army's counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq from the end of March 2003 through March 2004. His work provided a background on the Iraqi region and an introduction to the US counterinsurgency doctrine formulation and implementation in Iraq. Furthermore, he examined the US Army’s experience in counterinsurgency operations against the Moro Rebellion in the Philippines between 1898 and 1905 and the Hukbalahap Insurrection from 1946 to 1951, the Vietnam War from 1961 to 1975, and the El Salvador Uprising between 1971 and 1988. He further analyzed how the US military doctrine failed to adequately support the role of the US forces as an occupation authority. The author concluded that the basic principles outlined in the US counterinsurgency doctrine are still applicable in Iraq, but the US and coalition forces are not applying them as intended. He then recommended that the US should unify military efforts with a comprehensive economic, social and political reform plan. This arrangement calls for the work of military professionals who are not only adept in combat but are also competent in development missions in partnership with other state actors.
Calip (1975) studied how a well-balanced force would perform superbly in counterinsurgency operations. This balanced force entails the cooperation between leaders, planners, lawyers, operators and other actors of government and civil society. He traced the history of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) as well as its basic doctrines of insurgency and guerrilla warfare and proposed the need to come up with a well-balanced government force to perform counterinsurgency operations. He analyzed the effectiveness and applicability of the doctrines used in counterinsurgency campaigns and concluded that these were superficially applied in the Philippine situation.
Calip’s propositions were supported by Manthe’s (2001) as he showcased historical examples and scholarly studies of counterinsurgency and identified the insurgency concerns that must be addressed and the lessons learned upon which future counterinsurgency doctrines can be formed. He made specific proposals to reevaluate the existing doctrines, correct identified deficiencies and support the US national strategy as the government lacks a complete and coherent military doctrine for conducting counterinsurgency operations. Manthe observed that the leaders, planners, individual servicemen and members of major service branches are not trained for the performance of the full spectrum of the tasks necessary to achieve success in counterinsurgency. He emphasized that improvements in the competencies of the military organization are indispensable.
Meanwhile, Tan (1972) provided a historical account of the development of the AFP and the insurgency movement and emphasized the vital role of the major services in the counterinsurgency campaign. His analysis, however, was limited to four areas of Philippine Air Force (PAF) activities: (1) air support, (2) intelligence, (3) civic action, and (4) socio-economic programs. He further evaluated the role of the Philippine Air Force in counterinsurgency operations within the contextual roles of the whole AFP Command and the civilian sector in national development efforts.
In any counterinsurgent structure, the involvement of other forces is vital. In fact, Giampietri and Stone (2004) discussed that local defense forces are viewed by many counterinsurgency strategists as essential elements in defeating an insurgency. They observed that providing a population with a local defense organization will reinforce the government's strategy of extending its security and control over the rural areas affected by insurgent groups with the protection of the local population from insurgent attacks and influence. Their analysis illustrated how the employment of local defenses during the Malayan Emergency, the El Salvador's Civil War, as well as the Vietnam War and the Terrorist Epoch in Peru proved to be a force multiplier for the government’s effort, at least during the period within which they were effectively implemented. The authors’ main objective was to support the implementation of these local defense organizations and provide a set of variables to be considered when planning the implementation of local defenses as part of the counterinsurgency effort. However, both authors have also noted that every insurgency is unique and consequently demands a unique counterinsurgency strategy for its defeat. But they also pointed out an important commonality – that insurgent forces need the local populace’s support to subsist. The final success of the government, therefore, will be determined by its capacity to win and retain the support of the rural folks where insurgency thrives.
Even the Philippine case has also forwarded the involvement of civilian sectors. Cantillep’s (1975) study provided an analysis of the threat posed by the Philippine insurgency. He correlated this to the government’s total approach to national security and nation-building agenda. He then advanced a hypothesis that insurgency constitutes an immediate threat to the security of the Philippines; hence, all sectors of society must be actively involved in eradicating such threat. Since the rural population is the most affected, its complacency would spell defeat.
Espino (2004) likewise examined the role of paramilitary forces in the counterinsurgency operations launched by the AFP against the Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People's Army. He stated in his paper that the Philippine government and the AFP firmly believe that the present Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit Active Auxiliary (CAFGU-AA) is an essential component of the AFP's Operational Clear-Hold-Support methodology. Many scholars have argued that the separation of the communist guerrillas from the populace is an important element in winning the counterinsurgency campaign. Isolation of the communist insurgents from the rest of the population can be achieved through the creation of the local militia. However, some authors contend that it would be dangerous for any government to train paramilitary forces because no one really knows where their future loyalties will lie. They may be currently working for the government but they could use their acquired skills against the government in the future.
Thus, it is quite dangerous to train paramilitary forces. On a positive note, the Philippine
paramilitaries are good examples of paramilitary forces being used effectively for counterinsurgency. Their primary task of protecting the communities and the people from the coercive and abusive acts of the communist insurgents was achieved. They became an effective counterinsurgency force because of proper training as well as competent command and control. Espino concluded that the Philippine government and the AFP are headed in the right operational direction for utilizing paramilitary forces for village defense.
Moreover, participation of other law enforcement agencies and even by foreign organizations are also important in eliminating the insurgent threats. Chaerudin (2003) discussed that as Southeast Asia is experiencing tremendous political changes, an adequate solution is immediately required in order to make counterterrorist policies in accordance with broader foreign policies. He wrote that since the root causes of terrorism are anchored in domestic and international ethno-nationalistic issues, coordination and linkage between regional organizations are indispensable. Multi-lateral diplomatic organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) assist in forging substantive agreements that enhance the sharing of information, tighten border agreements and reinforce law enforcement cooperation. For example, the United States-ASEAN joint declaration on counter-terrorism provided for the parties to share intelligence, block terrorist cells, tighten borders and crack down individuals using forged travel documents. These are the kinds of responses that are imperative in today’s security scenario which highlight international cooperation as an important feature in the modern counterinsurgent structure.
Cassidy (2005) also documented the necessity of police forces in British counterinsurgency campaigns. He noted that history and an insular geography have helped shape a pragmatic, indirect British approach to strategy. Imperial policing, intrastate security, and counterinsurgency have been considered normal roles for the British Army. Stability operations have dominated the British Army experience and it has embraced them as central to the institution. Although the British Army has been successful in most conventional wars, for most of its history it has viewed its expeditionary role to fight on continental Europe as aberrant and peripheral.
In this study, the British approached insurgency with the critical assumption that insurgency is principally not a military problem. If required by the situation, Britain would bring in soldiers to back up the police, but the soldiers would always be aiding civilian power and would be obliged, just as the police were, to use only that level of force essential to restore order and to never exceed that level of force.
Close coordination between the Army and colonial administrators who implemented reforms and the police who maintained order was essential to the British approach to counterinsurgency. These operations required a degree of decentralization of command and control that “was further encouraged by the tendency of the insurgents to operate in small, highly mobile bands.” The British forces’ success story is good for emulation, as they have trained their army for internal policing work. In the local Philippine setting, coordination with local law enforcement agencies has taken a more active role in recent years.
3. On Resources
References on the subject matter offer different ways on how the utilization of resources in counterinsurgency is carried out. In all discussions, nonetheless, the use and control of resources are often referred to as underlying reasons behind the success or failure of most operations. The devastation brought about by prolonged guerrilla warfare, pitfalls in the economy, and the huge counterinsurgency expenses incurred by the government that drain the country’s resources call for an immediate solution to the insurgency problem. In some instances, the methods used by governments in denying the insurgents access to resources which are necessary for survival are often successful in driving out the armed insurgents from their sanctuaries.
Still, other innovative ways are proposed on how to infuse assistance to countries affected by insurgency and terrorism. Foreign support comes in different packages which include training and logistics, among others. Maslow’s framework on the “Hierarchy of Needs” is also utilized to fill up the gaps or inadequacies in resource allocation.
Marsman (2005) noted that the overt actions of external forces are primarily directed at the control of valuable resources. This was seen in the Japanese occupation of Malaya, where the Japanese colonizers took control of Malaya’s single dominant resource - rubber. He noted that the control of Malayan rubber is parallel to the manipulation of Iraqi oil for both are strategic commodities that ensure the survival of the national economy. Unlike in Iraq, however, the Malayan insurgency emerged initially as an anti-Japanese movement. The Allies originally backed the insurgents in the fight against an outside aggressor. Later on, the military arm of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), the Malayan Race Liberation Army (MRLA), co-opted the original movement and secured significant caches of arms from the war as a logistical foundation for the post-war domestic political insurrection. In later developments, insurgencies are fought by insurgents using armaments a large portion of which was salvaged from previous wars.
Morales (2003) studied local insurgent groups like the communists and the Muslim secessionists and lamented on how counterinsurgency expenses exacted a heavy toll on the Philippine economy. Moreover, the unstable peace and order conditions created by these have kept the country's economic performance far below its regional neighbors’. He added that these conflicts could have been settled earlier and the Philippines could have devoted its resources to resolving the economic causes which gave birth to the insurgencies in the first place.
Supnet (2004) likewise agreed with Morales’ point as he reiterated the fact that the Philippines is the only country in Southeast Asia beset with a long-running communist insurgency problem. The GRP and the insurgents have lost so many lives and resources in the protracted struggle and yet, victory is still elusive. After more than three decades of fighting, neither side can claim success. Years after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Communism, the communist insurgents in the Philippines are still a potent force and a main threat to the country's national security. This condition indeed has brought tremendous sufferings to the nation and people, as a whole.
In the British Doctrine (2008), the use of resources was calibrated with the development of smaller formations. This has prevented the maintenance of a strategic reserve and at the same time, made the soldiers conscious of a need to conserve equipment and ammunition. With financial frugality, therefore, the British were more likely to make a low-profile response, using their armed forces sparingly and applying solutions that did not necessitate large expenditures of men or material. Moreover, “the wide range of threats to imperial rule and the different geographical conditions encountered, produced a constant need to adapt responses to fit local circumstances and deterred the development of a stereotyped theory of policing.” Thus, the British have minimized expenditures to maximize its responses and attainment of success.
Singson (1975) gave a rather oppressive view of counterinsurgency using the case of the British presence in Malaya as a background. He said that the Malayan situation in the 1940’s covered political, economic and social aspects. He continued with the brief history of the Malayan Communist Party and the factors that promoted the decline of the communist insurrection with the application of the four phases of military operations, namely: Phase I and II, Resettlement, and Operation Starvation. In the last phase, the control of the flow of resources to insurgent forces offered successful results in favor of the government.
Veering away from the debate on resources generation and control, Blaufarb and Tanham (1984) provided a framework of analysis to help determine whether or not a government threatened by insurgency can prevail, and if this is indeed possible, what the odds of winning are. The authors discussed the foreign assistance required to make success more feasible. They defined insurgency as an organized attempt to overthrow a government by armed attacks continuing over an extended period of time so the viability of sourcing funds from foreign donors can somehow alleviate the difficulties faced by the government. They continued that insurgency in the Philippines is characterized by top-to-bottom political control; focused on developing and organizing popular support in the remote countryside; and is dependent on guerrilla tactics and protracted conflict. Hence, foreign assistance is a vital part of counterinsurgency reality.
David (2003) started from where Blauforb and Tanham took off. He analyzed the issues and prospects surrounding the Muslim secessionist movements in the Philippines and examined the government’s responses to address the grievances of the Muslim Filipinos. He also posited that the southern Philippines secessionist movement has developed once again into a major security concern for the national government and that the hostilities have taken a heavy toll on the nation's human and physical resources. Likewise, the rebellion has afflicted both regional and global security because of the reported linkages between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group with other Islamic militant groups. David argued that due to these conditions, the United States has already directly intervened in the Philippine counter-terrorism campaign by providing military assistance and deploying American combat troops in Mindanao. Various administrations have also used innovative combinations of military, political, diplomatic and socio-economic instruments to resolve the conflict. The presidential regime of Fidel Ramos appeared to have achieved a breakthrough in finding a lasting solution by assiduously instituting the policies of decentralization and regional autonomy. Although the government has settled the dispute with the MNLF, other equally dangerous groups like the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf Group have emerged espousing independence from the Republic of the Philippines. In all these cases, government peace initiatives included access to foreign support and establishment of development programs in the affected areas.
When resources are scarce, frugality must be applied as in the counter-guerrilla struggle in Malaya that lasted from 1948 to 1960 and “ended with the only victory won by a Western power against practitioners of revolutionary warfare.” The British fought this war as their guerrilla opponents did, with limited resources and fighting deep in the jungle for long periods with minimum supplies. They outfought and outsmarted the communist insurgents at their own game of camping, ambush and jungle tracking. Notably, the Army has undermined the insurgents’ ability to live off the local population by resettling villagers in model villages under government protection (Cassidy, 2005).
Still others found ways to improve resource allocation by using policies or frameworks from psychology and other disciplines of studies. Bailey (2005) added more insights into the Iraqi insurgency by stating that the physiological conditions existing in a country must be analyzed to determine not only the level of effort required to rebuild but also to determine what to rebuild. The manner of analyzing and providing for the basic needs of the people must be part of the strategic plan. Using Iraq as an example, Bailey observed that if the basic needs within Maslow's “Hierarchy of Needs” are identified and incorporated into the US strategy, then, nation-building can be better executed. From a strategic perspective, he posited that this is important not only because it fosters stability and leads to more security but also because it is basically a “hearts and minds” campaign. The implementation of this concept will prioritize planning, leading to less casualties and lower rebuilding costs. The author then proposed a US policy option on stability operations that focuses, first and foremost, on the provision of basic human necessities.
4. On Support
The doctrine of gaining the population’s support for counterinsurgency has long gained acceptance even in the writings of authors that documented the insurgencies that have transpired during the brewing years of the Cold War in the 60’s and 70’s.
The same methods in gaining popular support and the institution of a national ideology were also used against insurgent groups by denying them their mass base by directly relocating village folks. Although such method was controversial, it was widely successful in other countries like Malaya.
The British Doctrine (2008) recorded that the halcyon days of British counterinsurgency operations came to an end with the Malayan Emergency in the 1960’s. The British principles for counterinsurgency included the application of minimum force, cooperation between civil and military institutions, and decentralization of command and control supported by a regimental system that created initiatives in junior leaders. The Malayan experience had outlined the earlier doctrine on mass support which was later used by the American forces in the war in Vietnam.
Yadi (2004) further noted that Malaysia did not need to follow the conventional pattern of a superior power that uses stronger military force to gain a better security posture. Instead, Malaysia had chosen to adopt the more encompassing approach that defined national security as "the capacity of the society to protect individuals, groups and the nation from physical and socio-economic danger." With this approach, which was almost anthropological in nature, Malaysia had been able to promote a form of national ideology acceptable to all communities
and had thereby provided a common basis for achieving and maintaining peace and harmony. A stringent internal security law was also enacted in 1969 to sustain peace as well as to curb any threat from future insurgents and terrorists. In addition, the government created a development and security plan known as “KESBAN” to win the “hearts and minds” of the population and to launch massive border operations with Thailand to block the egress and exit routes of communists. As a result of such efforts, the Malaysian government's overall containment policy was successful and the government managed to secure the surrender of the communist insurgents in December 1989. Indeed, the people’s support only followed after the Malaysian government had instituted internal measures that were acceptable to all parties.
With the widespread recognition of popular support as a factor for successful counterinsurgency operations, the curtailment of the same support for the insurgents had become the aim of governments in counterinsurgency. In Higgins’ (2000) study, it was discerned that the strategic hamlet program applied in Vietnam was an application of the Malayan counterinsurgency model. However, in the case of Malaya, the ethnic composition of the population, the nature of the insurgency and the inherent capabilities of the bureaucracy created a unique set of conditions that made the hamlet program successful. These conditions allowed the British colonial government to implement an effective counterinsurgency strategy that isolated the guerrillas. The focus of the strategy was the resettlement of the rural population away from the jungle. The South Vietnamese government and its American and British advisers, however, misapplied the Malayan strategy in the implementation of the strategic hamlet program which was designed to isolate the rural Vietnamese from the Viet Cong. The authorities, failed to understand how the conditions in South Vietnam differed from those in Malaya. The implications of these differences accounted for the program’s failure.
In a parallel analysis, Kamps (2005) observed that the US’ involvement in Vietnam from the Kennedy to the Nixon administrations was marked by changes in strategy. He cited that the initial US assistance to the South Vietnamese government centered on President Kennedy's emphasis on counterinsurgency and nation-building. Though the State Department accurately characterized the strife as an invasion by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV or North Vietnam) early on, the greatest enemy was still identified as the Viet Cong (VC) or indigenous southern communists. For its part, the DRV attempted to characterize the conflict as a civil war rather than an interstate war. Bungled elections and the subsequent division of Vietnam into the North and South regions lent credibility to the Communist claims that South Vietnam (RVN or Republic of Vietnam) was a US puppet. Further, the tacit US approval of the coup against the Diem regime in 1963 lent additional credence to Communist claims. Kamps also stated that the early counterinsurgency efforts against the VC were guided by counsel from Sir Robert Thompson, the British counterinsurgency expert who led the successful long-term campaign to rid Malaya of communist guerrillas. However, the contextual elements prevailing in Malaya were notably absent in Vietnam. The author noted that the idea of concentrating at-risk population in strategic hamlets for easier defense worked in Malaya, but failed in Vietnam because rural Vietnamese society was traditionally rooted to its ancestral land unlike in Malaya.
Even the British Army recognized the usefulness of military subordination, use of local resources, intelligence gathering and the separation of insurgents from their local supporters as accepted counterinsurgency principles (British Doctrine, 2005).
Danilowicz (2003) also followed Higgins and Kamps’ positions and discussed that as the United States wages its global war on terrorism, it would be wise for it to apply the lessons learned in earlier counterinsurgency operations. Like many guerrilla forces, terrorist organizations require sanctuaries to train, plan and carry out attacks. A common goal of both counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism is to break the link or relationship between the insurgents/terrorists and the local population so as to deny the enemy sanctuary. While there is a military component to any counter-terrorist operation, a commander must also take advantage of diplomatic, information and economic tools developed within a counterinsurgency context when planning operations in the war on terrorism. The author further looked at the basic outline of the counterinsurgency operations developed by the United States over the past decades and considered how lessons from these may be applied to the current war on terrorism, with a particular focus on how the United States should act toward friendly countries that have unwillingly provided (or might provide) sanctuary to terrorists. Danilowicz also examined the success of earlier counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines (notably against the Huks in the early l950’s) and evaluated whether these can be applied to the current operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group and other Islamic terrorist/guerrilla organizations.
Meanwhile, Shergill (1986) discussed that the insurgents do not have complete control over subjective principles such as cause, popular support, leadership, external support and the creation of an alternate society. However, the insurgents have an advantage in the objective principles of the choice of terrain, engagement in protracted war and access to intelligence information. He believed that the principles of counterinsurgency should be mainly objective in nature and directed towards attaining the subjective principle of popular support. He further proposed that as insurgencies are of long duration, an early enunciation of the national objectives at the outset which covers long-term planning and organizing, and harnessing of the maximum potential of the country as a national approach is essential for immediate counterinsurgency success. He further stressed that the insurgents should be isolated in order to bring them back to mainstream society. In providing counterinsurgency support to a host nation, the aiding nation should first analyze the principles of insurgency and counterinsurgency in operation in the host nation. He has explained that promoting the common interests and national well-being as well as assuming minimum visible support are the necessary principles to be followed in providing counterinsurgency support. In the end, through a process of historical analysis, the author has improved on the principles of insurgency, counterinsurgency and counterinsurgency support to a developing nation. The author, however, stated that although these principles serve as a guide for the actions of the counterinsurgency forces, they do not address all insurgencies. Nevertheless, his positions tackled the generations of local as well as international support.
Moreover, the importance of getting outside support was also discussed by Thapa (2005). He wrote that after the end of the Cold War, the trend in the type of conflict has changed drastically from that of state-sponsored conflicts to those led by non-state actors which create terror around the world. The causes of various fractions adopting these means vary from religious to ethnic, economic, political and other vested interests served by disrupting peace and stability in a state, region or the whole world. The United States and other nations affected by acts of terror have pledged together to fight terrorism. International organizations like the United Nations (UN) which was formed after the end of the Second World War to resolve conflicts in the world, did not have a mandate to be able to confront such types of emerging situations. Many violent activities affecting nations and innocent civilians have become major concerns for the UN. The author emphasized the importance of the UN’s role in the fight against global terrorism and suggested methods to maximize its potential to combat the menace of this modern day dilemma.
Support from the UN and the US government are evident in Southeast Asian insurgencies. Berry (1997) posited that the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore each represents a different security relationship with the US. First, the US has had a long security tie with the Philippines. Although there are no longer American military bases in the country, the Mutual Defense Treaty remains in effect. Second, Malaysia has taken a neutral approach in its relationship with the US with regard to its national security programs to avoid antagonizing China. Third, Singapore has been more proactive in developing its security ties with the US. It has taken specific steps in the effort to keep the US engaged in the region. Berry also outlined the nature of the US military presence in East Asia from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period and identified some real and potential security threats in the region from the American perspective. These relationships offer a feasible model for other countries particularly in the Middle East as the US government extends its influence in the Gulf region.
Guerrero (2002) talked about domestic conditions and their impact on the terrorism and the insurgency problems. He discussed whether or not the current government’s counterterrorism strategy is effective against the Abu Sayyaf Group. He went on to propose some steps that can be done about it if it proved to be defective. He also discussed the history of Filipino Muslims in southern Philippines. Using the analytical framework of Bard O'Neill, the author analyzed the ASG’s history, organization, logistics, tactics and training. The variables affecting the operational environment such as terrain, climate, infrastructure, political culture, socio-economic conditions, domestic and external popular support, and the criminal justice and law enforcement systems were likewise examined. The Philippine government's case is an example of how external support plays a crucial role in subduing terrorist threats in southern Philippines.
Likewise, Brigham (2004) discussed the strategy of today's Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of executing the GWOT as a counterinsurgency campaign subordinated to a generalized war against terrorism. He argued that the current GWOT strategy, instead of weakening, is actually strengthening the enemy's center of gravity at the strategic level. He discussed the imperatives of strategic and operational COIN planning as well as the significance of integrating a multinational and representational coalition in fighting what is essentially an Islamic militant insurgency. Furthermore, he looked at the feasibility of America's role as the lead military element in today's counterinsurgency effort and why the American military effort may be better suited and more successful in a supporting role. Such coalition actually cornered the Philippines’ assent in the Iraq war. However, the pull-out of Philippine forces reflected the failure of such arrangements without the local populations’ agreement and acceptance.
Other authors view the Malayan insurgency and other insurgencies as based on ethnic principles so the government targeted the leadership of these groups. Bottiglieri (2000) believed that for most people, a “hearts and minds” campaign is the best strategy for defeating an insurgency. But there may be no one best solution applicable to countering all insurgencies. The opportunities and constraints which affect both the insurgents and the state dictate the best strategy. He tested this hypothesis against the most difficult form of insurgency - two Maoist insurgencies were analyzed to determine the effects of the state's strategy on the insurgents. Then, conclusions were drawn on the relevance of pursuing a universal counterinsurgency strategy. While countering the Shining Path insurgency in Peru,
the state employed three different strategies. In the end, the state recognized that the insurgency was elitist-based and launched a successful counter-leadership targeting campaign to defeat the insurgency. On the other hand, while countering the Malayan Communist Party insurgency in Malaya, the state employed two different strategies. In the end, the state discovered that the insurgency was limited to the ethnic Chinese community and adopted a successful campaign to separate the insurgents from the population. In both cases, the insurgent leadership’s role was important for the defeat of the groups.
In the Philippine setting, similar measures also moved Castillo (1974) to retrace the history of insurgency in the Philippines and assess the role of the prelate or religious leaderships in fighting it. The author also conducted an analysis of the projects and programs implemented for community development and their impact on the counterinsurgency effort. He likewise illustrated the achievements in community development of an Infanta, Quezon religious leader and deduced from it measures for counterinsurgency. As shown by this example, local community leaders can also be actively involved in lessening the insurgents’ clout in local communities.
5. On Technology
A number of authors emphasized the significance of technological advantage in waging successful conventional or unconventional warfare. While they have noted that US forces consider the new terrorist threats as manifesting a unique mix of adherence to ancient beliefs and reliance on modern technology, modern armies have taken the leeway in confronting these threats conventionally or unconventionally. The use of technology is also resorted to depending on the scale of operations. While past conflicts underline the edge of highly advanced economics in counterinsurgency, such advantage is negated by the prevalence of terrorist operations in the information age.
With all these positions, it is widely accepted that use of technology can indeed improve government performance through timely evaluation and feedback carried out in cyberspace. However, the same technological arrangements can also be easy targets to terrorist attacks.
Smart (2005) proposed the need to understand the traditional assumptions of terrorism that drive US strategy and define a new way ahead. He discussed that the US national strategy for the Global War on Terror has strategic roots tracing back to the national strategy to contain the Soviet Union. Changes to the strategy have been incremental and evolutionary, but still remaining within a geo-strategic, regionally-based paradigm that provides continuity. The declaration that global terrorism is the world’s number one threat was unforeseen before 9/11 US attacks. But the analysis of this threat and the proposed ways to deal with such problem conforms to earlier views of combating terrorism. The US viewed the global terrorists’ “jihadists” as a fundamentally different enemy. The latter combine corrupted ancient beliefs with modern technology and are organized in an information network structure. Yet, the US assumed that if it pressures this enemy in multiple regions around the world, they would return to traditional modes of operation on smaller regional and national scales where they can be defeated and completely eradicated. This is fundamentally similar to the Cold War notions of combating state-sponsored terrorism. However, the incidents of the last few years indicate that the enemy will not "de-globalize" but will evolve into something else, continuing to operate globally. The terrorists’ use of technology was the focal point of Smart’s paper which defines a new form of warfare that is continually evolving.
While the US viewed technology as a tool, the British believed otherwise, as the latter seems to exhibit more patience when it comes to protracted internal security problems, which is probably attributable to a tradition of operating in small, autonomous units in isolated and faraway places. Moreover, the British attitude to having casualties is best described as a stiff-upper-lip posture. A history of taking a limited number of casualties in remote places has made the British tolerable of casualties. The British Army does not try to avoid casualties and it does not seem to be averse to incurring them. Also, due in part to a history of limited resources, the British Army does not rely heavily on technology as a be-all and end-all success tool. However, it is evident that either in conventional or small wars, the use of technology is already a fixture.
Other significant conflicts in history have drawn the vital role of communication for fast relay of information, which can truly dictate outcomes. Examples are offered by the French Army when they were compelled to draw off troops thereby conceding to the guerrillas’ greater scope in other areas. Although French forces were far superior in numbers, they were unable to concentrate against Wellington’s combined Anglo-Portuguese force when Spanish guerillas compelled the French to disperse in order to protect their vulnerable lines of communication. The eventual defeat of the French forces was brought by their communication inadequacies.
Otherwise, most cases in past conflicts raised the value of targeting technology points to determine favorable outcomes. Asymmetric conflicts usually show an ostensibly superior external military force confronting an ostensibly inferior state or indigenous group on the latter’s territory. Asymmetry means the use of hit-and-run small unit tactics by irregular and paramilitary elements to harass, ambush, bomb and disrupt outposts, checkpoints or lines of communication. Practitioners of insurgency concentrate limited attacks against the critical vulnerabilities of regular military forces by using instrumental perfidy to undermine the overmatch of technology and the aggregate forces of their adversaries. Mao Tse Tung observed that defeat is the inevitable result when native forces fight against modernized forces on their terms, but such condition can be tilted when technological advantage is approximated with the use of guerrilla tactics.
The 20th century witnessed indigenous forces adopting Fabian/Maoist strategies fueled by nationalist and communist ideologies that challenged the colonial powers’ superior numbers and technology. In fact, the post-World War II historical records show that military and technological prowess is an unreliable indicator of success in small wars. In Algeria, Cyprus, Aden, Morocco, Tunisia, Indochina and Vietnam, indigenous nationalist forces achieved their political objectives through armed confrontation against big powers that possessed overwhelmingly superior conventional military forces. For insurgents, asymmetric war is total, but it is inherently limited for the great powers because insurgents pose no direct or immediate threat to their survival. Full military mobilization is not politically possible or considered necessary. The disparity in military capabilities is so great and the confidence that military power will predominate is so acute, that victory is expected (British Doctrine, 2005).
Despite full stories negating the impact of technology in counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency warfare, the utility of the same as a tool in information dissemination and in opinion formation cannot be downplayed. The use of technology has greatly aided counterinsurgency campaigns in the professionalization of operations and in the conduct of information drives directed at the populace.
E. Conceptual Framework
In reviewing various literature and studies on the role of national security administration through counterinsurgency policy implementation, the political-legal, ideological-informational, economic-social and security-military interactions that transpire in the global and regional security environments are noted as fundamental guides in defining the context of insurgency in the Philippines. These interactions gave rise to the evolution of the nature, principles, objectives and means of various insurgent entities.
Interestingly enough, the studies that were reviewed adopt the concept of enhanced application of the political, economic, psycho-social and military techniques to maintain government control where it exists, to restore it where it had been lost, and to acquire it in the rural countryside where it has not been previously established. The task is to carry it out as effectively as possible without hesitation, corruption or discrimination (Dimacali, 1990). All of these are factors are considered as the policy context of this study.
In implementing the counterinsurgency policy, this dissertation considers the framework of good governance in delivering all essential elements for a responsive policy implementation. This research likewise anchored its analytical framework on Grindle and Thomas’ (1990) policy context and content, in implementation analysis and essential parts of policy analysis.
Moreover, the combination of success and failure factors that were earlier derived from numerous counterinsurgency studies pointed to the necessity of their inclusion in this analysis for a more effective counterinsurgency strategy. These factors are derived also from Gow and
Morss’ (1988) discussion of critical problems in project implementation, and from Paul, Iglesias and Vining’s (1981) enumeration of success and failure factors in policy implementation. Such components include leadership and strategic management, structure,resources, support and technology.
First, leadership and strategic management as collectively defined in this study, means the authority and policy being applied to address insurgency. Its effectiveness will depend on the political leadership’s control and orchestration; the delineation of primary, secondary or tertiary responsibilities; the application of approaches and methodologies; and adoption of a form of warfare and security orientations.
Second, structure identifies the politico-administrative institutions that coordinate in a holistic manner in order to offer a comprehensive security and development package to counter insurgency. The combination of counterinsurgent forces include concerned agencies of the government and other sectors of society, even the insurgent forces themselves in governance. This draws the relationship among various forces in a more mutual and coordinative environment.
Third, resources sustain the bloodline that bankroll different projects and activities for the successful implementation of counterinsurgency policies. For this study, resources will include the general annual appropriations for the AFP as the lead institution in the government’s counterinsurgency drive; accounted/recorded US military aid and US Excess Defense Article Grants to the Philippine Government; and other nations’ donations - all reflected in US dollar denomination. Other logistical assets are also included like transportation, armaments and communication equipment. Additional appropriations for the AFP Modernization Program and other special releases are also factored in.
Fourth, the support factor considers the approval of the local population and the international community of counterinsurgency policies. These important sectors determine successful policy outcomes. The population’s support includes that of civilian government agencies, local government units, civil society, business sector and other domestic security stakeholders. The international community’s support covers that of the United Nations, international non-government and human rights organizations, among others. These organizations usually show their positive agreement with or negative perception of the local counterinsurgency initiatives in the international arena which bear significant effects on the efficacy of policy implementation.
Fifth, the technology factor outlines the prevailing operational methodology adopted by counterinsurgent forces against insurgents. This also includes Information and Communication Technology (ICT), especially the mass media for information operations and other available high-technology systems that have relevant effect in the expedient relay of information for more efficient counterinsurgency operations. Recent advancements in cyberspace are technological advantages that are maximized in counterinsurgency operations.
All of these variables and the essential components of the definition are culled from the numerous books and theses earlier reviewed.
Success and Failure
Factors
1.
Leadership and Strategic Management
Level of Control and Orchestration.
Delineation of primary, secondary and tertiary responsibilities.
Application of approaches and development methodologies.
Adoption of form of warfare and security orientation.
2.
Structure
Organization of politico-administrative institutions.
Composition of military personnel to counter insurgency.
Combination of other counterinsurgent forces (paramilitary, civilian
volunteers, etc).
Participation of other security stakeholders (local law enforcers, foreign
armed forces, etc).
3.
Resources
Total military spending based on general annual appropriations.
Infusion of US military aid and other Excess Defense Articles Grants.
Inclusion of logistical assets (transportation, armaments, communication
equipment).
Additional appropriations for AFP Modernization and other programs.
4.
Support
Population’s agreement (civilian agencies, LGUs, civil society, business, etc).
International community’s recognition and acceptance.
Inclusion of insurgents’ leadership in security governance (peace negotiations,
unification, development).
5.
Technology
Utilization of operational methodology (conventional or unconventional).
Use of mass media and other Information, Communication and Technology.
Availability and accessibility to high-technology systems for Information
Operations, Command and Control, Intelligence Gathering, etc.
The involvement of all concerned security stakeholders like the state/government, political sector, market/private sector, civil society, international community and media in implementing counterinsurgency policies with all its indispensable components are considered as the administrative contents of the study’s conceptual framework.
Furthermore, in analyzing the external security environment (context) that breeds insurgency and the attendant counterinsurgency policies (content), we are able to arrive at the final objective of all these interactions which is the attainment of social peace and political stability.
It is represented here by the reintegration of armed insurgents back into mainstream society and the resulting productive co-existence of all contending forces. This normative aspiration is a direct result of the progression and reduction of armed insurgent strength as documented all these years.
With all the aforesaid derivations and identification of variables, this study adopts the conceptual framework in the next page.
This framework will be used all throughout the study.
Figure 24 – Conceptual Framework
F. New Counterinsurgency Model
Furthermore, an innovative way of presenting this conceptual framework is through the counterinsurgency model in the next page that depicts three layers of concentric circles. This is similar to the conceptual framework but only highlights the inclusion of measurable variables. The outer circle reflects the external security environment as the context, while the middle circle represents the administrative content. The innermost circle serves as the measure of the success or failure of all the policies and programs formulated in the global, regional and local environments.
(context) influence on administrative responses (contents), in the same manner that the armed
insurgency’s numerical strengths (outcome) are also affected through by all these
interactions.
The eventual reintegration of armed insurgents into the mainstream society is indicative
of the degree of social co-existence and peace that transpires after effective implementation
of counterinsurgency policies.
Figure 25 – New Counterinsurgency Model
